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INSURANCE
By

EDGAR HUNTER WILSON*

A number of the Georgia cases in the field of insurance were concerned
with the question of whether the insurer had waived its right to rely on
certain policy provisions. Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Cash' was a suit on an
automobile collision policy. The company relied on a provision in the
policy which stated that the insurance was not effective while the automobile was subject to encumbrances not described in the contract. The
policy had blanks for the indication of encumbrances and other information. These blanks were not filled up. It appeared that the agent had not
asked the plaintiff about encumbrances when the policy was written. The
court decided that the failure of the agent to inquire amounted to a waiver
of the clause concerning the existence of encumbrances.
Two cases found waiver of the policy provision requiring proof of loss
to be filed within sixty days after loss. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v.
Berry held that making oral proof of loss to a local agent and being assured that such statement was sufficient along with the fact that the company conducted an investigation within the sixty-day period would constitute a waiver by the company. Another case held that refusal of liability
on the part of the company amounted to a waiver of the proof of loss requirement.
Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tennessee v. WJlood' was an action by the
beneficiary of a life insurance policy. The insurer based its defense on the
military clau~e which provided that the insured was only covered in time
of war if the company was notified in writing and a higher premium paid.
Plaintiff had not complied with this provision, but had orally notified a
local agent who had uo authority to waive policy provisions and who failed
to notify the company. The court refused to find a waiver, and distinguished
this case from an earlier decision 5 on the ground that in the earlier case
an agent with authority to execute waivers had actual knowledge of the
military service and had continued to accept premiums under those circumstances. In another case ' on a life contract, the existence of a waiver
of the policy provisions concerning reinstatement was denied on the ground
that mere acceptance of premiums after the grace period by an agent
without authority to waive policy provisions, and the retention by the
company of the premiums for several weeks until demand was made for
payment, was not such conduct as would constitute waiver. There must be
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some affirmative showing of a knowledge of the facts on the part of the
company.
Carrollv. Garlington-HardwickCo.' and Standard Accident Ins. Co. v.
Fowler' dealt with the problem of cancellation of automobile liability insurance. In the Carroll case the company was sustained in its contention
that the policy had been cancelled by the sending of notice to the insured
that the policy would be cancelled if premiums were not received within
five doays. This was so in spite of the fact that the- company later received
premiums which were retained until it was discovered that the policy had
been cancelled. The insured reeiid on the fact that credit had been extended on policies of earlier years, but the court decided that the notice
sent negatived any credit after the notice date. The Fowler case was rather
unique on its facts. The insured had applied to a lawyer, who was a claim
adjuster for the defendant, for a liability policy. The lawyer had referred
the matter to an agent who wrote the policy. Sometime later the plaintiff
called the lawyer to inquire if he had to take the policy and was informed
that he was legally bound but that the company would not hold him if he
desired not to take the policy. Whereupon, the plaintiff expressed the desire to be released. The lawyer went on vacation at this point and failed
to notify the company to cancel the policy. Plaintiff had an accident and
then called at the defendant's office to inquire if his policy was still in force.
He was informed that it was and, upon paying the premium, was presented
with the policy. The court held that the policy was in effect at the time of
the accident. The lawyer was termed a conduit through which the plaintiff
attempted to convey his desire to cancel but which failed. The lawyer was
found to have no power to issue or cancel policies for the company.
Construing the coverage clause of an insurance policy in relation to a
specific set of facts has given rise to some of the most difficult cases in the
law of insurance. A nice question of construction and application of the
coverage clause arose in Wallace v. Virginia Surety Co.' There, the policy
contained the following language:
"In consideration of the premifim at which the policy is written, it is agreed
that the automobile or automobiles described in the policy will be used and
operated within a radius of 500 miles of the place where such automobile or
automobiles as described in said policy are principally garaged.
"It is further agreed that the company shall not be liable for, nor will it pay
any loss or claim whatsoever that results from any accident or loss occurrine
while the automobile or automobiles described in the policy are being operated
outside of the radius of 500 miles ......

Plaintiff's truck had been on a trip to Miami, a distance of 725 miles
from the place of garage, but the accident occurred on the return trip
when the truck was only 275 miles from the place where it was principally
garaged. The majority held that the policy did not cover a trip which
took the truck outside of the so mile radius. The dissent thought that
the first clause was ambiguous but that the second clause made it clear that
liability was denied only when the accident occurred outside of the de7.
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scribed radius. The question was so close that either opinion is difficult.
to criticize; but, in view of the rule that ambiguous clauses are construed.
against the insurer, the dissent seems to take the sounder position.
Moore v. American Ins. Co. of City of Newark, New Jersey" was another case requiring an interpretation of the coverage clause. Plaintiff purchased a truck without a bed or body: He insured the truck with the defendant and told the agent at the time that he planned to put a cement
mixer on the truck. The policy described the truck and stated that the
truck and its "permanent equipment" were covered. Plaintiff welded the
cement mixer to the chassis. The truck and mixer were damaged in a collision whereupon the plaintiff sought to recover under this policy. The court
found that "permanent equipment" referred to equipment permanently
attached at the time the policy was issued and not a $4,000 mixer later
added. The opinion seemed to place a great deal of weight on the fact
that the mixer was worth almost as much as the rest of the truck and found
it difficult to believe that the policy was intended to cover such added
equipment at the same premium. The court's opinion seems sound but,
nonetheless, there is a good chance that the plaintiff was reasonably led
to believe that all of the truck's equipment was covered.
In one case" the court held that the plaintiff's claim that her husband
was a dependant within the meaning of a policy obligating the company to
pay a sum to her on the accidental death of a "dependant" member of her
family was not subject to a general demurrer. The fact that the law places
the duty of support on the husband would not control in this case, but
rather it was a question of actual dependency. Also, in Interstate Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Hulsey," the word "steamship" in an accident policy
was interpreted not to cover a motor launch in which the insured was riding out to board a steamship.
The court interpreted an accidental death policy in Independent Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Hopkins.'3 The pertinent provision read: "The agreement as to benefit under this policy shall be .null and void if the insurer's
death results, directly or indirectly, from any of the following causes: . . .
(a) as a result from the intentional act or acts of any person or persons."
It was determined that even though the death resulted from the willed act
of another, the intention of the actor must have been to cause the result
before it would bring the death within the quoted exception.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Jones'4 was a ruling that the jury would be justified in finding that a death resulted "directly and independently of all
other causes from bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent
and accidental means

. .

. " in spite of the fact that it was shown that the de-

ceased suffered from Parkerson's disease. But in Gulf Life Insurance Co. v.
Bolt' insufficient evidence was presented to justify a recovery on an accident policy for loss of eyesight.
Two cases, Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Hearing" and Gulf Life Ins.
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Co. v. Griffin,'7 involved the application of the "sound health" clause. In
the Hearing case there was no positive evidence of an unsound condition
of health known to the applicant at the time the policy was issued, although
it did appear that the deceased was a nervous person and not completely
developed as to her mental status. The court found no violation of the
clause providing that the policy would not take effect if the insured was not
in good health at the time of delivery of the policy. In the Griffin case the
following language was used in reference to the application of the "delivery in sound health" clause: The sound health clause "refers to a change
in the condition of the applicant's health between the time of taking the
application for insurance and the date of the issuance and delivery of the
policy, and is unavailable as a defense unless it is shown that the insured's
disease developed during that period." It was also noted that the clause
that the insured enjoys such health and strength as to
meant only "...
justify the reasonaable belief that he is free from derangement of organic
functions, and to ordinary observation and to outward appearance his
health is reasonably such that he may with ordinary safety be insured upon
ordinary terms."
The application of Code Section 56-703, providing for payment of attorney's fees and a penalty against insurance companies failing in bad
faith to pay claims, was considered in three cases. In one case 8 the court
stated that bad faith meant a "frivolous and unfounded denial of liability."
And it also added that if there is a reasonable ground for denying liability, there will not be such bad faith as contemplated by the statute. In
Independent Life & A1ccident Ins. Co. v. Hopkins'9 the court decided that

the failure of the insurance company to investigate a claim within sixty days
from the filing of the claim was sufficient to sustain a jury finding of bad
faith. In a case involving a contract surety bond2" it was found uncessary to
determine whether Code Section 56-703 applied to surety bonds because
there was not enough evidence to show bad faith even if the statute was
applicable.

C. L. Fain Co. v. Baltimore American Ins. Co. 2' and Great Aimerican

Ins. Co. v. Gusiman22 were found, on their own peculiar facts., to have established thefts within the meaning of their policies.
No important legislation concerning the substantive law of insurance
was passed during the survey period. The following statutes concerning
procedural and administrative matters were enacted during the period: an
amendment to clarify the autohrity of mutual incorporated and co-operative fire insurance companies to write insurance against loss occasioned by
the operation of any and every kind of motor vehicle;"' acts providing for
substituted service of process on insurres not authorized to transact busi17.
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ness in Georgia ;2-' an act to regulate unfair trade practices in the marketing1
of insurance; 5 an act changing the license fee for compaines and agents;
an act raising the capital stock requirement to $ioo,ooo for companies doing industrial life, health and accident underwriting, and permitting them
to write ordinary life insurance ;2 an act dealing with participation in 'net
reserves by policyholders; 28 and an act authorizing political subdivisions
and state departments, bureaus. etc., to deduct amounts from the wages of
employees for the purchase of group insurance, provided employee consent is obtained. 9"
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